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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 27/01/2008 Accident number: 523 
Accident time: Not made available Accident Date: 02/09/2005 
Where it occurred: Not made available Country: Chad 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Missed-mine accident Date of main report: Not made available 
ID original source: None Name of source: [Name removed] 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: PMA-3 AP blast Ground condition: not recorded 
Date record created:  Date  last modified: 27/01/2008 
No of victims: 2 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: Not made available Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate investigation (?) 
safety distances ignored (?) 
visor not worn or worn raised (?) 
mine/device found in "cleared" area (?) 
 
Accident report 
Details of this accident have been withheld by the demining NGO that employed the Victim. A 
spreadsheet including the Victim’s name and very brief details of the accident was made 
available in 2007. Some details can be inferred from the information released. For example, 
the face injury implies that the victim’s visor was not being worn in the correct manner. 
This entry will be expanded if access to the report of the investigation is made available in 
future. 
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The spreadsheet data is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. 
“Date and country. [Name removed] - Section leader  - lightly injured on the side of 
the left eye - eyesight not endangered. 
[Name removed] - Deminer -  injured right foot, 3 toes ripped off. 
Mine explosion type PMA3, excavating sand from two destroyed vehicles when deminer 
stood on mine.” 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 689 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: supervisory  Fit for work: presumed 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: Not made available 
Protection issued: Not recorded Protection used: Not made available 
 
Summary of injuries: 
minor Eye 
minor Face 
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 690 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: Not made available 
Protection issued:  Protection used: Not made available 
 
Summary of injuries: 
AMPUTATION/LOSS: Toes  
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. 
 
Analysis 
This accident is classed as a “Missed-mine accident” because the deminer was excavating 
and stood on a mine while doing so. It must be presumed that he only stood on an area that 
he knew was safe. 
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The primary cause of this accident is listed as a “Field control inadequacy” because the Victim 
was working in a manner that led him to miss a mine and his errors were not corrected. It is 
possible that the supervisor was close to him because he was supervising at the time, so 
safety distances may not have been ignored. 
The PMA-3 is a small mine and very difficult to detect but, being inside a vehicle, a metal-
detector could not have been used anyway. At 110mm diameter, it should have been 
detected during any excavation to an appropriate depth.  
The secondary cause is listed as a “Management control inadequacy” because the 
management of the demining group declined to make the accident details available. Although 
this is sometimes done to protect the Victims, in this case the Victims’ names were among the 
limited detail made available. It is possible that the managers have chosen to avoid 
transparency because they are afraid that the circumstances of the accident would reflect 
badly on their organisation. 
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